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Abstract 
We examine how information technology (IT) contributes to organizational change, labor 
demand, and improved productivity in the public sector using a new panel data set of police 
departments covering 1987-2003. While IT adoption is associated with increased 
administrative and organizational complexity and use of more highly educated officers, IT 
itself does not appear to enhance crimefighting effectiveness. These results are robust to 
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use. IT investments do, however, appear to improve police productivity when complemented 
with particular management practices–in this case, those associated with the Compstat 
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1 Introduction
Public sector organizations are important consumers of information technology (IT),
primarily because many public functions such as revenue management, crime-fighting,
and education are essentially information processing tasks.1 Thus, we might expect
large changes in the cost of processing information to have an important impact on
public organizations. Despite a growing literature on the effects of the spread of infor-
mation technology (IT) on firms, there is little evidence regarding the extent to which
IT is related to organization and productivity in the public sphere. In this paper we
study the relationship between IT and the internal structure and effectiveness of pub-
lic agencies using a newly constructed panel data set of police departments covering
1987-2003, which we have merged with FBI local-level crime data.
Our paper contributes to large bodies of research on the skill content of technological
change and the impact of IT on the organization of work. Despite a growing literature,
our knowledge of IT’s role is still spotty, in part due to a paucity of firm-level data
on organizational change, worker skill, and information technology adoption over time.
Some previous studies of the impact of IT cannot examine organizational changes
because they use the industry or a single firm as the unit of analysis [e.g. Stiroh (2002),
Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998), and Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994), Aral,
Brynjolfsson, and Alstyne (2007)], or because they rely on a cross-section of firms [e.g.
Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, Reenan, and Zilibotti (2006) and Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson,
and Hitt (2002)2]. Others do follow individual firms over time, but either have no data
on information technology adoption [e.g. Rajan and Wulf (2006), Berman, Bound,
and Griliches (1994)], or no information on organizational change [e.g. Brynjolfsson
and Hitt (2003)]. Only a very small number of previous papers provide firm-level
evidence on the evolution of information technology, skill usage, and organizational
1Following Arrow (1974), a large literature studies organizations as information processing and
problem solving institutions – e.g. Radner and Zandt (1992), Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), and
Garicano (2000).
2This paper has panel data on IT and inputs, but cross-sectional information for organizational
variables.
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change; notably Caroli and Reenen (2001), which reports data for the 1980s in the
UK, and from the early 1990s for France, and Doms, Dunne, and Troske (1997), who
study a panel of manufacturing firms between 1987 and 1992. Like these papers,
our paper utilizes organizational-level data on the evolution of skills, organization,
and information technology adoption. However, to our knowledge it is the first to
systematically examine non-manufacturing firms – in our case, public organizations
– and is unique in its coverage of almost half the firms and the majority of workers
in the observed industry. Moreover, it is the only paper to include a long panel (16
years) covering most of the period of the recent IT revolution. Finally, by combining
agency-level data on crime rates and arrest levels with our organizational data, we are
able to incorporate rich productivity measures into our analysis.
We start by studying the relationship between computerization and productivity
and organization using a panel of police departments. Our basic empirical strategy
compares, controlling for city size and other characteristics, the organization and pro-
ductivity of departments that adopted more computing technology to that of depart-
ments that adopted less. Consistent with previous research,3 we find that IT adoption
and skill are complementary–departments that adopt IT increase police training and
introduce college requirements for new recruits. This increase in training appears
primarily related to the need to learn to use new devices, rather than IT-induced en-
hancement of the training process. Moreover, adopting departments become larger,
increasingly employ special units, and include a larger fraction of support personnel.
In sum, agencies become more highly skilled and their organization in many ways more
complex. Despite these changes, we find little evidence that general IT adoption is as-
sociated by itself with an increase in the productivity of police work, as measured both
by clearance rates and crime rates. We carefully analyze the generality of these results,
and find them robust to alternative samples (by period, early adopters, growing versus
non-growing cities, etc.) and specifications of the IT measure.
We next attempt to assess whether the associations between IT and organizational
3See, for example, Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) and Lehr and Lichtenberg (1999).
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change we document represent a causal effect of IT. Given the nature of organizational
change, which often involves simultaneous adjustments on a number of dimensions and
which may be driven by factors unobserved to researchers, sorting out causal pathways
can be challenging. In particular, our findings suggesting that IT may promote orga-
nizational change could reflect reverse causality or omitted variable bias. Using the
available data, we attempt to address several alternative explanations for the strong
relationship between IT use and our organizational measures. By including both year
and agency fixed effects in our specifications, we first remove variation that may be due
to systematic differences across departments (such as geography) and macroeconomic
trends. We also find our results robust to inclusion of time trends by state or initial
level of computerization.
If, as agencies increase in size, their optimal structure involves increasing use of IT
and changes in organizational form, failure to adequately account for agency size could
suggest a spurious effect of IT on organization. In each of our baseline regressions we
flexibly control for the relevant aspect of agency size or workload. As additional checks,
we rerun our regressions first limiting the sample to the largest and smallest agencies
and then including a full set of agency-size decile and year interactions as controls.
The strong positive relationships between IT, worker training, and worker skill persist
in these specifications.
Poorly managed departments may undergo overhauls that affect both IT use and
organizational variables. Using civil litigation cases filed against an agency in 1987 as a
measure of initial department quality, we uncover little evidence suggesting differential
IT adoption by poorly functioning agencies. Alternatively, younger, dynamic cities,
such as Houston or Seattle, may have unobserved characteristics that promote both
IT use and different bureaucratic evolution. Limiting the sample to shrinking cities or
cities with little population change does not alter our conclusions, however.
We also estimate specifications including leads of IT intensity as additional ex-
planatory variables to assess whether exogenous organizational reform could prompt
IT adoption (reverse causality), but obtain little indication of such effects. Another
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possibility is that agencies with larger budgets are able to implement both information
technology and superior organizational practices such as increased training. However,
the strong relationship between IT and organization persists when we directly control
for equipment expenditure in our regressions, suggesting that this relationship is not
driven primarily by resource availability.
We also study whether our findings reflect (previous) mismeasurement of crime:
although some information technologies, such as those that identify crime ‘hot-spots’,
should improve deterrence, others could actually worsen crime statistics. For example,
if crime reporting is improved, reported crime rates will increase while clearance rates
will drop. Our data contain detailed questions on computer functions, such as record-
keeping, police dispatch, fleet management, etc. We test for heterogenous effects of
different technologies by simultaneously entering record-keeping and deployment mea-
sures in our panel regressions. We find that offense reports increase by 10% when
computers are used for record keeping, and that these effects occur for crimes such as
larceny that are more likely to suffer from under-reporting rather than those which are
typically reported, such as homicide and motor vehicle theft. However, our estimates
provide little evidence of an ameliorative effect of IT on crime even taking into account
the consequences of improved measurement.
As a final check, we employ two different instrumental variables (PC availability in
the broader area and body armor use) that attempt to capture variation in the supply
of and demand for IT exogenous to our organization and effectiveness measures. These
instruments are of somewhat limited quality, but they support the hypothesis that IT
adoption promotes organizational change. In summary, although we cannot address
all alternative explanations for the IT-organization link, the weight of our evidence
is most consistent with a causal effect of information technology on organizational
structure, with the large technological changes driving IT adoption in the broader
economy contributing to both computerization and increased organizational complexity
within the police sector but having little apparent effect on productivity.
In the private sector context, some researchers have argued that a barrier to the
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success of IT may be the need to implement IT together with particular organizational
changes, an application of the complementarity hypothesis first advanced formally by
Milgrom and Roberts (1990).4,5 Although IT by itself may have little impact, its impact
may be substantial when introduced within the context of an organizational and human
resource system designed to take advantage of it. In the specific context of police
work, the complementarity hypothesis takes one very salient form: Compstat. The
system of practices summarized by this name was initially introduced in the New York
Police Department by Police Commissioner William Bratton under Mayor Rudolph
Giuliani’s leadership and then spread throughout the country. The program aimed
to combine real-time geographic information on crime with strong accountability by
middle managers in the form of daily group meetings, geographic resource allocation,
and data-intensive police techniques. The program was widely credited in the press
and by policymakers with playing a substantial role in the recent precipitous drop in
crime experienced by some cities.6
To test the complementarity hypothesis, we study the impact of information tech-
nology when it is adopted together with skilled officers, new problem-solving tech-
niques, extensive use of ‘output’ information in evaluation and deployment of officers,
and a geographic-based structure.7 Although the data available for testing this hy-
pothesis are much shorter and more limited (questions on these type of practices were
only introduced in the survey in 1997), they clearly endorse this hypothesis. We find
crime clearance rates were an average of 2.2 percentage points higher in agencies imple-
menting this integrated set of practices. Similarly, crime rates are negatively associated
with Compstat use. Moreover, the individual practices composing Compstat have no
4In their analysis of modern manufacturing, Milgrom and Roberts (1990) argue that, given the
existence of complementarities among organizational practices, a range of organizational choices may
have to be altered together for a particular technological advance to improve efficiency. In the presence
of complementarities success is not “a matter of small adjustments, made independently at each of
several margins, but rather involve[s] substantial and closely coordinated changes in a whole range of
the firm’s activities.” (p. 513)
5Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) review this literature.
6Some research has disputed the claim of a large effect of Compstat; see, for example, Levitt (2004)
and Rosenfeld, Fornango, and Baumer (2005).
7Our approach is similar to Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997), who study complementarities
among HRM practices and their impact on productivity. IT is not, however, a focus of their study.
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independent ameliorative impact on crime levels or clearance rates.8
We thus conclude that IT may improve police productivity, but such improvements
only occur when IT is introduced in conjunction with certain organizational prac-
tices oriented to take advantage of new data availability. More generally, our results
demonstrate that many of the forces identified in the labor literature on IT in profit-
maximizing firms–such as IT-induced shifts in demand for skilled labor, heterogenous
productivity effects of IT, and IT/management practice complementarities–are also
apparent in public sector organizations.
2 Data Description
The data are drawn from the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Sta-
tistics (LEMAS) series, a triennial survey of law enforcement agencies in the United
States covering the years 1987-2003.9 Although not specifically designed as a longitu-
dinal survey, the broad coverage of the survey makes it possible to identify numerous
agencies at multiple points of time.10 The surveys provide rich data on a wide vari-
ety of police operations, including shift scheduling, equipment usage, agency structure
and functions, officer compensation, and administrative policies. To supplement the
LEMAS data, we have matched the surveyed agencies with annual arrest and offense
data from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) and place-level demographic data
from the Census where possible.
One of the strengths of this data set is that it contains questions on a variety of
different types of IT use and covers a period of enormous IT expansion. Figure 1 plots
aggregate trends in IT use by police agencies. The upper graph details use of different
8Again, the causal interpretation of this increase must be qualified. If a system of complementary
changes must be undertaken, the fact that some departments choose not to undertake these changes
may reflect some omitted variable, such as the quality of management of the department, in which
case the 2.2% is biased upwards. This problem is common to a large extent to all of the literature on
organizational change (see e.g. Ichniowski and Shaw (Forthcoming)).
9The 1996 survey was conducted in 1997, and an additional survey was conducted in 1999.
10All state police agencies and all agencies with 100 or more officers are automatically sampled
with probability sampling for the remaining agencies. In each year roughly 3000 of the approximately
19000 U.S. law enforcement agencies are represented.
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types of information technologies, including PC’s, mobile data terminals (typically used
by officers to access vehicle, criminal background, or other information while in the
field), and mainframes and servers. In 1987, fewer than 20% of the surveyed agencies
used any computers, but over the next 12 years computer use showed substantial
increases, with PC use growing more rapidly than more specialized technologies. By
the end of the sample over 90% of responding agencies reported IT use. The large
increase in mainframe and server use near the end of the sample is likely attributable
to the increased importance of the Internet in the latter half of the 1990’s.
The middle chart in Figure 1 details use of computerized data files by function.
Growth trends in data use for arrests, service calls, and stolen property were comparable
through the entire sample. The final chart demonstrates a significant asymmetry in
IT adoption according to agency size. A substantial proportion of the largest police
agencies already had computing technologies by 1987. In stark contrast, only 2 of the
over 2200 departments with 100 or fewer employees in 1987 reported using computers.
Between 1987 and 1990 there was widespread adoption of computers by mid-sized
agencies, with the smallest agencies lagging behind until the final years of the sample.
Our preferred measure of computer usage is a computer index constructed as the
proportion of nine computer/data functions present in an agency in a given year.11 The
advantage of this index relative to simple dichotomous IT measures is that it captures
not only the existence of IT within an organization, but the degree to which IT is used
to perform disparate tasks.12 During our sample the computer index increases from an
average of .11 in 1987 to .64 in 2003.
Table 1 provides summary statistics describing the measures of output, organiza-
tional structure, and worker skill that we employ in our analysis. The varying number
of observations reflects the fact that not all survey items are available in all years and
UCR and Census data were not available for all agencies. In total, approximately 8600
police agencies are represented at some point in the sample, with over 1800 agencies
11The nine functions we include are computer use for crime analysis, investigation, and dispatch
and data record use for arrests, service calls, criminal histories, stolen property, traffic citations, and
warrants.
12In Section 4 we demonstrate the our basic results are not sensitive to this choice of IT measure.
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registering observations in 4 or more sample years. Many of the police agencies in the
sample are county or city agencies within moderately-sized jurisdictions, but university,
state, and large city police departments are also represented. The areas represented
are slightly poorer, less educated, and less diverse than the overall United States.
3 Patterns in IT Adoption, Organizational Change,
and Productivity
In this section we examine our organizational and outcome measures for evidence re-
garding their relationship with computerization. In our basic analysis we use OLS
regressions and separately report specifications including year or agency and year fixed
effects and additional time trends. In all regressions we attempt to control for other
relevant factors that may affect our outcomes of interest. If differential acquisition of
information technology is driven by factors exogenous to the agency, such as variations
in the cost of technology over time and place, these coefficients would reflect an effect
of IT on our organizational measures. However, it may be the case that omitted factors
or reverse causality explain some of the associations we find using OLS. In section 4,
we re-estimate the regressions from this section using instrumental variables as well
other reasonable specifications. Accounting for possible endogeneity of IT adoption,
limiting the sample, using alternative IT measures, and richly controlling for potential
confounding factors does not alter our basic conclusions.
3.1 Agency Size and Complexity
To measure agency size, we count the total number of sworn and non-sworn personnel
reported by each agency.13 The distribution of agency sizes is highly right-skewed, and
the median size of surveyed agencies rose from 25 in 1987 to 57 in 2003. Among agencies
reporting in all sample years, the median size also rose from 328 to 472 employees over
the sample period, suggesting a general trend towards larger departments. In order to
13We consider part-time employees as equivalent to 12 of a full-time employee.
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control for workload in our regressions relating industry size to IT use, we include as
controls indicators for deciles of number of offenses reported by an agency.
We consider several measures of agency complexity. Our first measure of agency
complexity is the agency’s total number of special units. Special units are smaller
groups of officers with specific expertise and focus on a particular crime class or ad-
ministrative program, such as gang investigations or school outreach. In some cases
officers are involved in special units as their primary assignment, while in other cases
officers with general policing responsibility also participate in special units on a part-
time or ad hoc basis.14 Unsurprisingly, agency size is highly correlated with special
units as well as our other complexity measures. In our empirical analysis we control
for agency size in all specifications.
Our next complexity measure is the number of hierarchical levels in the agency,
which we infer based upon whether or not separate salary ranges were reported for
chiefs, sergeants, and junior-level officers in the survey. This is a somewhat crude
proxy for the degree of hierarchy in the agency given that many larger police agencies
have substantially more than three administrative levels. Our final measure is the
number of written departmental policies.15 This measure is likely affected by not only
the complexity of the organization (a more complex organization requires more policies)
but also the quality of management oversight and use of documentation, all factors that
may be affected by IT.
The top rows of Table 2 demonstrate that IT use is positively and significantly
associated with our measures of agency size and complexity. The coefficients on log
employees are much larger in the specification without agency fixed effects, likely be-
cause of the enormous cross-agency size heterogeneity. Even the smallest point estimate
of 8.5%, however, suggests a substantial effect of IT on size. IT appears to promote
specialization and use of written directives as well, although the coefficient estimates
14The special units that are consistent across sample years that we include are special units for child
abuse, community crime prevention, family violence, drug education, drunk driving, missing children,
police/prosecutor relations, career criminals, and victim assistance.
15The possible policies are policies governing general police conduct, use of deadly force, handling
of domestic cases, and interactions with juveniles, the homeless, and the mentally ill.
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diminish as more fixed effects and trends are added to our regressions. Finally, IT is
not significantly associated with the number of hierarchical levels after controlling for
agency fixed effects and time trends.
3.2 Agency Composition
In addition to affecting the tasks performed by workers, new technologies also can
potentially shift the types of workers employed by agencies. The LEMAS data differ-
entiates sworn officers, which are typically officers with arrest powers, from other types
of police employees.16 It also provides separate counts of the number of employees in
field operations and technical support roles. Theoretically an IT-induced improvement
in the productivity of arresting officers could lead to an increase or decrease in the field
share of officers depending on the form of the policing production function. Many fed-
eral programs for funding IT improvements in police agencies, however, were instituted
with the explicit goal of shifting police personnel from desk to street duty.17
Table 2 suggests that IT adoption has little connection to employment of sworn
officers. The point estimates for all four specifications relating officers with arrest
powers to IT use are negative and of small magnitude. Similarly, after controlling
for agency-level heterogeneity there is little evidence that IT increases the proportion
of workers assigned to field operations. Increases in IT intensity are associated with
increases of 4-7% in the percentage of staff that are assigned technical support roles.
This increase is similar in magnitude to the increase in overall agency size, suggesting
that the primary effect of IT on personnel is to enlarge the police department by adding
employees that maintain the technology infrastructure as opposed to employees that
perform more traditional police functions.18
16One caution regarding this data is that some officers may officially have arrest powers even if they
essentially perform administrative duties.
17For example, the descriptive material for Making Officer Redeployment Effective (MORE), a
Federal grant program administered by the Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented
Policing Services (COPS), states, “The MORE program increases the time available to law enforcement
professionals for community policing activities by funding technology that enables a department to
operate more efficiently.” (Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 2002)
18These results sharply contrast with Doms, Dunne, and Troske (1997), who find using panel data
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3.3 Worker Skill
Most years of the survey ask whether the department requires new entrants to have
college experience, permitting us to directly link computer use to demand for college-
educated labor. Although a number of papers have posited a link between increases in
the demand for skilled labor and computerization (Mincer 1991, Bound and Johnson
1992), most past empirical studies of this proposition have relied on indirect evidence,
such as cross-industry differentials in worker skill and computer use (Berman, Bound,
and Griliches 1994, Autor, Katz, and Krueger 1998). Implicit in most models of
computer-driven changes in skill premia is the notion that highly computerized firms
would be more likely to hire better educated workers because such workers can more
productively use the available information technology.
A lower row of Table 2 reports linear probability regressions19 of the computer index
on an indicator for whether an agency requires entrants to have prior college experi-
ence. To account for factors potentially correlated with computer use and demand for
education, all specifications include controls for agency size as well as the income level
and adult educational distribution in the agency’s geographic area. A shift to complete
computerization is associated with a 3.3% increase in the probability of requiring col-
lege education, a sizable increase given that only about 13% of agencies require college
education. Indeed, in 1997, agencies reporting PC use were twice as likely to report
college requirements for entering workers than those without.
In addition to the relationship between worker education and IT, some past authors
have suggested that IT adoption can impose increased training requirements for new
workers, leading to skill increases generated within the firm (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson,
and Hitt 2002). The bottom row of Table 2 reports estimates of the effect of IT adoption
on the number of training hours provided for new hires by the police agency. Although
controlling for year fixed effects reduces the estimated effects of IT adoption somewhat,
in all specifications the estimates are large and highly statistically significant.20
that increases in technology were not associated with increases in the non-production share of labor.
19Logit and probit regressions provide similar results.
20Although the magnitudes of the estimated effect of IT use on training appear large, they are not
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IT use may affect training through two channels. One direct consequence of IT
adoption is the necessity of training new officers on the appropriate use of the technol-
ogy. Such training may be particularly necessary when agencies use IT specialized for
police work, such as mobile terminals or proprietary record-keeping software. Another
possibility is that the incorporation of information technology into the training process
(for example, by allowing for computer-based interactive activities) increases the value
of training hours for activities not directly involving computers. Unfortunately, the
training data do not contain additional detail that might permit disentanglement of
these mechanisms. However, because we do have information on different IT functions,
we can examine the extent to which increased training is associated with general-
purpose IT such as PCs, which have the potential to affect the overall training process,
versus more specialized technologies.
Table 3 tests this proposition by entering PC use and mobile computer use indi-
vidually into the training regression. We posit that mobile data computers, which
are typically specially designed systems that provide officers with in-vehicle access to
crime information, cannot enhance general training but likely require device-specific
instruction. Although the estimated coefficients for both types of IT are positive and
significant, the coefficient on mobile terminals is more than twice as large as that on
PCs. The control coefficients indicate that larger police agencies and agencies with col-
lege requirements also conduct more training. These results suggest that the increase
in training is due primarily to actual use of new information technologies as opposed
to technical improvements in training.
3.4 Policing Outcomes
One way in which our analysis departs from prior work is our use of public-sector data.
Many past studies of IT have focused on manufacturing industries with intuitive output
unreasonable given the enormous increase in training observed over the sample period. Between 1987
and 1990, the period which saw the largest rise in adoption of IT, average training hours rose from 163
to 633, an almost four-fold increase. By 2003, almost half of sampled agencies required new officers
to undergo more than 6 months of training.
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measures such as productivity and profits. Although some authors have argued that a
primary role of IT in police organizations is to improve police problem solving(Brown
and Brudney 2003), there is little empirical evidence connecting IT use to improved
enforcement. In this section we first examine the extent to which IT enhancements
are associated with increases in clearance rates21. To examine the deterrent aspect of
enforcement we also consider offending rates per population as dependent variables. To
examine possible asymmetries in the usefulness of IT across crimes, we also separately
examine violent and property arrests.22. Although arrest and offending measures are
indicators of enforcement output, these measures must be viewed with appropriate cau-
tion. In particular, simple arrest and offending measures fail to account for conviction
rates, elimination of concentrated areas of crime, and other factors that may enter into
the objective functions of police departments.
Table 4 reports our results. Although there appears to be a positive effect of IT on
clearance rates in the first specification, the effects disappear after controlling for place-
level heterogeneity with agency fixed effects. The data do not suggest that agencies
that increased IT substantially over the sample period had superior clearance rates to
those with little IT adjustment. Estimates for offending rates, on the other hand, are
positive and sometimes statistically significant, although including agency fixed effects
and trends weakens the relationship somewhat. For property crime, an increase of
.53 in the computer index is associated with a .0016 percentage point, or roughly 5%
increase in offenses.
The final rows of Table 4 consider the possibility that the effect of IT is to allow
agencies to achieve the same clearance rates with less risk to officers. Such safety
enhancements might occur through substitution away from street officers to adminis-
trative personnel or by providing information to officers that allows them to identify
risky individuals and locations. The departmental organization data provided some
21The clearance rate is the number of crimes for which an arrest was made divided by the total
number of offenses reported to police. Because arrests can occur for crimes committed in prior years,
clearance rates can be above 1. For a more detailed discussion of the use of clearance rates in crime
research see Skogan and Frydl (2004, 160).
22Further disaggregation to individual index crimes provides comparable results
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evidence of the former effect, although the evidence regarding percent sworn personnel
was mixed.
Increases in the IT index are generally associated with decreases in both officers
assaulted and officers killed, although estimated coefficients are statistically signifi-
cant only in the more parsimonious specifications. The fact that the effect on officers
assaulted disappears after controlling for computer index-year trends may reflect dif-
ferential investment patterns in other technologies that can improve officer safety by
high and low computer agencies.
Given the positive association between IT and firm productivity documented by
past researchers [e.g., Lichtenberg (1995), Stiroh (2002), Black and Lynch (2001)] and
widespread use of IT in modern police departments, our finding that computers con-
tribute little to productivity may seem somewhat surprising. One possibility is that
the increase in size, specialization, and written directives we document does not re-
flect augmented structure, but rather the increased ‘administrative clutter that often
accompanies IT deployments. Such an interpretation is consistent with Goolsbee and
Guryan (2006) and Ellison (2002), who suggest in very different contexts that the pri-
mary effects of IT may be to alter the production process without improving production
outcomes.23
In the next section of the paper we examine whether these results may be driven
by misspecification, endogeneity, or omitted variables.
4 Robustness Checks
4.1 Alternative IT Measures and Samples
In Appendix Table A-1 we examine the robustness of our basic results to alternative
choices of computerization measure. Specification I uses a binary variable for PC use in
place of the computer index as a measure of IT while specification II uses an indicator
23Goolsbee and Guryan (2006) find that more access to the Internet by schools does not measurably
increase student achievement, while Ellison (2002) suggests that IT may result in a shift in from a
focus on content to a focus on style.
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for any computing technology. Specification III improves the panel quality of the data
by limiting the analysis to agencies observed in 4 or more time periods. Specification
IV omits 1987 from the sample to assess whether the results are driven mainly by
the large increase in computer use that occurred between 1987 and 1990. The final
specification limits the analysis to agencies which reported some IT use in their first
year in the sample. This specification examines whether the observed effects can be
attributed to changes in IT intensity as opposed to simple adoption of any IT.
Employing different measures of IT use changes the results little, although the
alternative measures are more weakly associated with worker skill and training than
the index. The results for agencies observed in 4 or more years, which tend to be
slightly larger agencies, are also consistent with the baseline. Limiting the analysis
to 1990-1999 reduces the estimated coefficients on technical support staff and training
by about half, which is unsurprising since it seems likely that the largest training and
administrative changes would occur during the early stages of IT adoption. Agencies
with IT in 1987 saw the smallest increases in technical support staff and these agencies,
which are much more likely than average to include college requirements, saw relatively
small effects of IT on demand for skilled entrants. Overall, the results appear fairly
robust to sample and specification changes.
4.2 Alternative Interpretations
Our OLS results, while robust to sample changes, may not reflect a causal relationship
between IT and organization. Clearly it is possible that agencies adopt new technology
because of organizational restructuring, in which case our estimates reflect causality
running from outcomes to IT, or that a third factor causes both IT and organization
to change together. In this section we conduct specific tests of some of the main
alternative non-causal explanations and then employ instrumental variables strategies
to address endogeneity more generally. Although no single approach we employ can
completely rule out endogeneity as an explanation for our results, taken as whole the
evidence is most consistent with a causal effect of IT on organizations.
15
Pre-existing trends: Departments adopting IT could be those that observed
previous negative trends in performance or other variables. As the department reforms,
it installs IT systems and adopts a wide range of changes that lead to upward biases of
the impact of IT – a form of the “Ashenfelter dip.”24 We examine this by replicating our
analysis including leads in the computer index as additional explanatory variables.25
Any tendency toward decay in our dependent variables prior to the introduction of IT
should be manifest in negative coefficients on these leads.
Table 5 demonstrates that for our organizational measures there is little evidence
of an Ashenfelter dip, with none of the coefficients on leads statistically different from
zero and equal numbers of positive and negative point estimates. The coefficients on
the index itself, in contrast, typically maintain the same sign and significance as in the
baseline.
Delayed effects: Another potential explanation for the apparent lack of relation-
ship between IT and outcomes is that IT only improves policing after an initial learning
period. The second specification in Table 5 tests for this possibility with lags of the
computer index as additional regressors. Given the 3-year separation between most
surveys, it seems likely that any delayed benefits of IT implementation would be cap-
tured by this lagged term26. The coefficients on the lagged term, however, are generally
negligible and statistically indistinct from zero. The coefficients on the contempora-
neous index, in contrast, remain positive and significant for the agency size measures
and officer training.
Previous mismanagement: An alternative interpretation for our results is that
departments that reorganize and adopt IT are those that were previously underper-
forming and acquired new management. IT has no causal effect in this case.
The 1987 LEMAS survey includes questions on the number of civil litigation cases
24Ashenfelter (1978) observed that participants in training programs had unexplained drops in pay
just before enrollment.
25One limitation of such analysis in our setting is that many agencies are observed in only a small
number of years. Introducing leads thus changes our sample composition somewhat.
26In unreported regressions we include an additional lag and obtain similar results.
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filed against the agency in that year.27 One reasonable conjecture is that more troubled
agencies would have experienced higher levels of litigation. If being troubled drives both
organizational change and IT change, we should observe different trajectories for the
IT index for agencies with high versus low initial levels of litigation. Appendix Table
A-2 examines this possibility by regressing long differences in the computer index on
the litigation level in 1987 and finds little evidence that agencies with high litigation
exhibited differential IT changes. The magnitudes of the differences in IT change
between high and zero litigation agencies are small relative to overall change and not
statistically different from zero.
Size-related heterogeneity: Failure to adequately control for agency size could
also suggest a spurious relationship between IT and our organizational variables if,
as agencies grow, they require increased IT as well as a more specialized, educated
workforce. This concern seems particularly salient given the strong relationship be-
tween IT use and agency size documented in Figure 1. We have already attempted to
address this possibility by including controls capturing the relevant aspect of agency,
community, or workload size in all of our basic specifications.
As an additional check we allow for highly flexible effects of size on the organiza-
tional variables by re-estimating the regressions in Tables 2 and 4 including a full set of
interactions between indicators for deciles of agency size and year. We also rerun the
analysis limiting the sample to agencies with fewer than 25 employees or agencies with
greater than 100 employees. The results of these regressions are reported in Table 6.
The findings for agency size, technical support staff, training, and demand for college
are consistent with the baseline.
The middle columns of Table 6 report additional checks of the hypothesis that our
results are driven by general reorganization associated with population growth. Column
IV includes population decile-year interactions. Column V limits the analysis to only
places in which population fell over the course of the sample. Column VI includes
only agencies in areas in which the population changed by 10% or less. Column VII
27Unfortunately this question was not asked in subsequent years.
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builds a sample of agencies in comparably sized areas by considering only agencies with
base population between 80000 and 120000. Areas with declining or stable populations
yield point estimates of similar magnitude to the universe of agencies. Thus, it does
not appear that community growth is driving both IT acquisition and organizational
restructuring. The evidence linking IT with improved officer safety is much weaker
after accounting for community growth.
Agency resources: A final concern is that agencies with greater financial resources
may both purchase IT and implement superior organizational practices, such as hiring
more workers and providing better training to existing workers. Column VIII of Table
6 reports regressions that attempt to flexibly control for differences in resource avail-
ability by interacting the log of equipment expenditures28 with indicators for deciles
of equipment expenditure. Although these controls do not perfectly capture resource
differences across agencies, encouragingly, their inclusion does not substantively alter
our results.
Improved measurement: The widespread adoption of various forms of informa-
tion technology by police agencies during the 1990’s appears at odds with our robust
findings that general IT has no net relationship to clearances and is actually associated
with an increase in offense rates. One potential explanation for these results is that
our index, which provides a fairly general measure of IT intensity, could mask het-
erogenous effects of different information technologies on our enforcement outcomes.
For example, offenses might be higher in places with more computers simply because
officers may be more willing to file police incident reports when filing can be done using
computers instead of by hand. Other technologies, such as technologies that improve
officer deployment, may at the same time have a deterrent effect on crime.
To disentangle these potentially competing effects of IT, we exploit the detailed
use questions in the LEMAS survey. We measure IT use for report writing using an
indicator for whether computers are used for record keeping. To measure IT-enhanced
deployment, we use the average of indicators for computer use in dispatch, fleet man-
28Unfortunately, information on annual expenditures on equipment is available only from 1987 to
1997 and the value was estimated by some agencies.
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agement, and manpower allocation.29
Table 8 reports regressions entering the record keeping and deployment variables
simultaneously as explanatory variables for offenses. For total arrests, the coefficient on
the record keeping computer use indicator is positive and significant, suggesting that
offense reports increase by 10% once computers are available for record keeping. Com-
puter use to enhance officer deployment, in contrast, enters negatively and marginally
significantly, consistent with a deterrent effect of improved deployment capabilities.
The additional columns replicate the analysis on different individual crimes to provide
an additional test of our interpretation. Given the seriousness and rarity of homicide,
homicide is almost universally reported. Similarly, because auto insurance companies
typically require police reports in the case of motor vehicle theft, computerization is
less likely to affect reporting for this crime. For these two crimes the estimated co-
efficients on the record keeping variable are statistically indistinguishable from zero.
It seems unlikely that improved police deployment could exert a deterrent effect on
rape30, and indeed the coefficient on the deployment index is small and statistically
insignificant.
Apparently one explanation for the positive association between general IT and
offending is that reporting technologies increase crime reports even while other tech-
nologies may deter crime. However, this analysis does not allow us to reverse the
conclusion that IT had limited impact on productivity. Adjusting the coefficients on
the total offense rate in Table 4 to account for improved reporting yields coefficients
close to zero.31 In addition, effects of IT on patterns in violent crime, which are less
likely to be affected by reporting problems, are negligible. The estimated effects of
deployment technologies are quite modest. Thus, the lack of positive impact of IT on
29Our results are not sensitive to separately or simultaneously entering in individual deployment
measures.
30Braga (2001) reviews studies documenting the effects of police patrols on various types of crime
and disorder. None of the major studies includes rape as an outcome of interest.
31The proportion of agencies using computers for record keeping increased from 14% to 76% between
1987 and 2003. Based on the coefficients in Tables 8, this increase would translate to a 6%, or roughly
.002 percentage point change in the offense rate, which should be subtracted from the coefficients on
the total offense rate in Table 4.
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police productivity is not a statistical artifact.
Other Forms of Endogeneity: We attempt to address additional sources of
endogeneity using instrumental variables. Our search for appropriate instruments is
significantly complicated by our requirement for data sources that exhibit both geo-
graphic variation and which are available in the earlier years of our sample. We consider
two instruments for the computer index. The first is the percentage of workers in an
agency’s state and year who use computers at work. The work computer-use data was
obtained from CPS Computer Use Supplement surveys and has been used in a num-
ber of past studies of computerization including Krueger (1993).32 Areas with many
work computer users likely had greater availability of computer hardware and exper-
tise as well as increased exposure to computers among the general population; both
phenomena would likely increase the likelihood of computer adoption. Conceptually,
this instrument attempts to capture exogenous variations in IT supply and thus helps
address factors such as prior crime increases or unobservable managerial ability that
may affect our outcomes of interest and also influence IT adoption.
The second instrument we consider is an indicator variable for whether or not an
agency provides body armor to officers. This instrument attempts to capture idiosyn-
cratic willingness of agencies to invest in new police technologies. Given that body
armor represents a substantial expense for police agencies33 and vest designs are con-
stantly evolving, body armor is more likely to be available in ”technology-minded”
agencies. Here we thus assume that there are exogenous factors determining the tech-
nology orientation of an agency that affect demand for both body armor and IT.
Although with any instrumental variables analysis there are potential threats to the
validity of the instruments, insofar as these combined instruments provide comparable
estimates to the baseline, we might interpret this as evidence that our primary results
are not driven by endogeneity. In particular, given that our instruments are designed to
32Because the supplement is available in only selected years, we use linear interpolation across years
where necessary to generate computer use measures for the appropriate years. Unfortunately, the
sample size of the CPS precludes calculating computer use measures at finer levels of geographic
disaggregation than the state.
33A typical bulletproof vest for a single officer costs around $500 dollars.
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capture variation in IT that should not be related to past crime trends or management
reform, we provide further evidence here against two alternative hypothesis, namely,
that crime spikes precede reorganizations and IT adoption or that agencies which are
poorly managed or poorly functioning acquire new managers who undertake reforms
including computerization.
Table 7 reports the instrumental variables estimates. Although for a few of the mea-
sures with more limited availability (special units, % field operations, and % sworn) the
instruments perform poorly, the coefficients on both instruments are generally signif-
icantly positive with fairly large first-stage F-statistics for the combined instruments.
The magnitudes of the first-stage coefficients suggest that technology-orientation as
proxied by body armor availability generates a slight increase in IT use with a more
substantial effect arising from changes in availability of IT. Over the sample period,
the mean change in work computing of .25 is predicted to raise the computing index
by roughly .1.
The IV results for the departmental size and complexity measures are comparable
in sign to our initial results and continue to suggest that IT increases department com-
plexity. For the educational and training measures, in contrast, IV provides weaker
evidence of skill/technology complementarity than OLS. For offense rates, the IV es-
timates remain positive and statistically significant, with IT-induced offense increases
concentrated among property crimes. The somewhat implausibly large, negative IV
coefficient on assaults may reflect failure of the exclusion restriction for body armor
and this particular outcome.
5 Complementarities in Law Enforcement Manage-
ment
One possible explanation for the small effect of IT on police effectiveness is that IT
increases police department productivity only in conjunction with a broader set of
practices. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) proposed such a complementarity hypothesis
21
in the manufacturing context, contrasting two basic systems, modern versus traditional
manufacturing. Subsequent work, such as Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002),
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003), and Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw (2005) has identified
empirical examples of complementarities between IT use and management practices.
In the law enforcement context, modern policing has been most closely identified
with the Compstat system first introduced by the New York Police Department in
1994 by Commissioner William Bratton. In the popular imagination, Compstat is
characterized by two elements: the real-time mapping of crime, and the notorious early-
morning meetings where commanders must show they understand and are reacting to
the crime patterns projected on overhead screens. The program, in actuality, has
additional elements. Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally, Greenspan, and Willis (2003,
427) argue that Compstat is composed of the following six elements: (1) statement of
the measurable goals of the department; (2) internal accountability, particulary through
Compstat meetings – managers are accountable for understanding crime patterns and
reacting to them; (3) geographic organization of command – district commanders have
authority and resources to accomplish goals within areas; (4) empowerment of middle
managers; (5) data driven problem identification and assessment; and (6) innovative
problem solving tactics.34
Our data allow us to identify four management techniques corresponding to ele-
ments identified by Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally, Greenspan, and Willis (2003). In
particular, we consider (1) use of information technology for crime data collection and
analysis (5 above), (2) a problem-solving paradigm (6 above), (3) use of feedback for
priority-setting and evaluation (relating to 1, 2, and 5 above), and (4) a geographic-
based deployment structure (3 above). Following the economics literature on skill
complementarities, we include a fifth management practice – the use of more highly
educated officers.
Ideally, to test the complementary explanation we might use regressions similar
34Other accounts coincide with the broad elements although not on all the details. For example,
the New York Times summarizes the program thus: “specialized units, statistics-driven deployment,
and a startling degree of hands-on leadership” (Dewan 2004).
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to those in Section 3 with separate and interacted measures of IT and management
practices as explanatory variables. Unfortunately, this approach is limited by our
available data in two important ways. Most of the questions regarding management
practices identified by Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally, Greenspan, and Willis (2003)
as key to improving police performance were not asked in the LEMAS survey prior
to 1997, a time by which many larger agencies had already implemented Compstat or
similar programs. The other major data limitation is that because of the subjective
nature of some of the questions regarding management practices, there appears to be
some inconsistency across years in reported practices, potentially rendering inferences
based upon within-agency time-series variation in practices misleading.35 To overcome
these limitations, we average responses to individual survey questions across years to
develop an agency-level indicator for each of the aforementioned management practices
covering the period 1997-2003. We then define Compstat agencies as those which
simultaneously had elements of all five key management techniques in at least half of
the sample years.36 Our regressions examining complementarities thus exploit cross-
sectional variation in IT and management practices.
Table 9 reports regressions of the average agency clearance rate over 1997-2003 on
agency-level indicators for Compstat use and separate indicators for each of the five
components comprising a Compstat system. Separate specifications are reported for
total, violent, and property crimes with and without demographic controls. The results
are striking. Whereas the estimates on each of the individual management practices
are of negligible magnitude and generally statistically indistinguishable from zero, the
combination of practices into a Compstat system yields positive and significant effects
on clearance rates. The coefficient estimates of around 2% imply a roughly 10% gain
relative to the average clearance rate of 22%. For violent crimes, which in many cases
35For example, one survey item asks whether officers use a particular police problem-solving method-
ology known as SARA (scanning, analysis, response, and assessment). The Little Rock PD reported
using SARA in 1997, 1999, and 2003 but not 2000 while the Bakersfield PD reported using SARA in
2000 but not 1999, 1997, or 2003. The police in Hillsborough, CA reported using SARA in 1997 and
2000 but not 1999 and 2003.
36The construction of these variables is described in greater detail in the Appendix.
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are an area of particular investigative emphasis, the point gains are even greater.
Table 10 reports comparable regressions with offense rates as the dependent vari-
able. Whereas some of the individual management practices appear positively associ-
ated with offense rates, consistent with our finding in section 4 regarding reporting,
use of a Compstat system is negatively and significantly related to total and property
offending. The estimated effects of a Compstat system on crime rates are small to
moderate – the estimates imply, for example, that having a Compstat system has an
equivalent effect on crime rates as a 4.4 percentage point increase in the poverty rate.37
Given that we only have approximate measures of the Compstat practices and are
forced by data limitations to rely on cross-sectional variation, our results on the role
of complementarities are only suggestive. Taken together, however, the regressions
in Tables 9 and 10 support the hypothesis that an additional reason for the weak
aggregate relationship between general IT and policing outcomes may be that while
many agencies utilize some type of IT, relatively few have yet implemented all of the
complementary management practices that allow IT to impact police effectiveness.38
6 Conclusions
This paper provides new evidence on the role of IT in the public sector. As in firms,
IT and worker skill are complementary in police agencies, with IT adoption influencing
both the demand for college-educated employees and internal training levels. Evidence
on the impact of IT on public-sector performance is more sobering, however. It ap-
pears that IT results in ‘bureaucratization–increased agency size, greater use of written
directives, and a larger share of non-production personnel–with little or no impact on
37Given our findings here, one natural question is whether the outcome regressions reported pre-
viously suffer from omitted variable bias due to failure to control for management practices. If the
management practices are positively correlated with computer use (as they are in our sample) and are
actually beneficial in solving cases or deterring crimes, the omission would bias our estimates towards
finding an effect, which we do not.
38One natural question arising from these findings is why Compstat or similar programs are not more
widely used by police agencies. Possible factors limiting Compstat adoption include the high monetary
cost of implementing all the necessary practices, police union resistance to higher accountability
standards, and diffusion lags in knowledge of Compstat management techniques.
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productivity. One finding qualifies this pessimistic assessment: while the effects of
general IT on crime fighting and deterrence are statistically insignificant (in spite of
our large samples), this effect becomes relatively large when IT adoption is undertaken
as part of a whole package of organizational changes. These results are a clear endorse-
ment of the complementarity hypothesis. Police departments, like firms, are likely to
enjoy the benefits of computerization only when they identify the specific ways the new
information and data availabilities interact with existing organizational practices and
make adjustments accordingly.
Looking at more specific uses of computers, we also find that some computing tech-
nologies increase recorded crime, which appears as lower productivity. More generally,
computers may themselves alter the quality and type of data available to researchers
in ways that obscure productivity computation. Distinguishing the different channels
through which IT might impact not only performance, but also its measurement, re-
mains an important area for future research.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Measure N Mean SD Min Max
Computerization Measures
Computer index 19461 0.509 0.362 0 1
PC use 13720 0.638 0.481 0 1
Computerized record keeping 16294 0.632 0.482 0 1
Departmental Size and Complexity
Number of employees 19893 197 959 0.5 55929
Number of special units 19461 1.12 2.26 0 8
Organizational levels 15216 2.82 0.50 1 3
Total written directives 14639 3.95 2.03 0 6
Departmental Organization
% officers with arrest powers 19893 0.785 0.171 0 1
% field operations staff 5549 0.606 0.193 0.003 0.995
% technical support staff 7764 0.120 0.117 0 0.877
Worker Skill and Training
College requirement for new officers 16164 0.128 0.334 0 1
Hours of training for new officers 15712 669 472 0 2080
Arrests, Offenses, and Officer Injury
Total crime clearance rate 14793 0.229 0.164 0 1.083
Violent crime clearance rate 13920 0.559 0.272 0 1.095
Property crime clearance rate 14525 0.188 0.147 0 1.083
Total offense rate 14773 0.034 0.033 0 0.496
Violent offense rate 14781 0.004 0.006 0 0.203
Property offense rate 14777 0.030 0.030 0 0.495
Officers assaulted 9458 63.7 290 0 9024
Officers killed 9458 0.019 0.159 0 4
Demographic Characteristics
Total population 19529 225608 1282226 0 35484453
% Black 19362 0.103 0.159 0 1
% Hispanic 19362 0.066 0.133 0 1
Poverty rate 19362 0.137 0.082 0 0.657
Median household income 19362 39173 15743 4208 202242
% high school graduate 19362 0.763 0.112 0.203 1.000
% college graduate 19362 0.200 0.124 0 0.883
Note: Computerization and other organizational measures are taken from the LEMAS survey. Ar-
rests are from FBI UCR data. Demographic information corresponds to the area covered by each
agency and are taken from the 1990 and 2000 Census with linear interpolation across years.
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Table 2: Relationship Between IT Use and Organizational Structure
Dependent Variable (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Departmental Size and Complexity
Log(Number of employees) .514** .0842** .0872** .0560** .0637**
(.0355) (.0100) (.00955) (.0107) (.0103)
Number of special units 2.78** .445** .451** .333* .299*
(.160) (.146) (.149) (.154) (.138)
Organizational levels .0410** .0214 .0172 -.0159 -.00219
(.00997) (.0129) (.0129) (.0147) (.0111)
Total written directives 1.54** 1.71** 1.68** .989** .927**
(.0494) (.0711) (.0715) (.0743) (.0661)
Departmental Organization
% officers with arrest powers -.00591 .00557 .00681 -.00287 .00443
(.00544) (.00475) (.00475) (.00521) (.00434)
% field operations staff .0720** -.00709 -.00893 .00212 -.00901
(.0148) (.00790) (.00772) (.00827) (.00774)
% technical support staff .0642** .0727** .0729** .0384** .0361**
(.00605) (.00610) (.00609) (.00716) (.00634)
Worker Skill and Training
College requirement for new officers .0549** .0338** .0308* .0470** .0241
(.0115) (.0129) (.0122) (.0129) (.0125)
Hours of training for new officers 230** 201** 203** 143** 102**
(12.0) (14.2) (14.1) (15.7) (14.2)
Include year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Include agency fixed effects? No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Include state trends? No No Yes No No
Include computer index trends? No No No Yes No
Include initial level trends? No No No No Yes
Note: This table reports regressions of measures of organizational structure on a computerization index.
Each table entry represents a coefficient estimate from a separate regression where “Dependent Variable”
is the left-hand side variable and controls are included as specified in the bottom rows of the table. The
employees regression includes indicators for deciles of total offenses interacted with the log number of
offenses as additional controls. The special units, organizational levels, directives, and percentage workers
regressions include indicators for deciles of number of employees interacted with the log number of employees
as additional controls. The college requirements regressions include controls for the log number of agency
employees as well as the per capita income and percent of residents 25 and over with educational attainment
of below high school, some high school, high school, some college, associate’s degrees, bachelor’s degrees,
and advanced degrees in each agency’s geographic area. The training regressions include controls for log
number of agency employees and whether new entrants are required to have college experience. Column
III includes state-specific yearly trends, column IV includes indicators for initial levels of the computer
index interacted with year trends, and column V indicators for deciles of the initial value of the dependent
variable interacted with year trends as additional controls. Standard errors clustered on agency are reported
in parenthesis. * denotes significance at the two-tailed 5% level and ** the 1% level.
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Table 3: Effects of General and Specific IT Use on
Training
Explanatory Variable Estimate
PC indicator 43**
(9.05)
Mobile terminal indicator 110**
(14.2)
Log(Employees) 95**
(3.37)
College requirement indicator 88**
(15.6)
Number of departmental functions -15.739**
(2.42)
N 7552
R2 0.412
Note: This table reports coefficients from a regression
of the total hours of training required of new recruits on
indicator variables for general and specific IT and other
controls. The regression includes year and state fixed
effects and incorporates data from 1990-1999. Standard
errors clustered on agency are reported in parenthesis.
* denotes significance at the two-tailed 5% level and **
the 1% level.
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Table 4: Relationship Between IT Use and Arrests, Offenses, and Officer Injury
Dependent Variable (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Total crime clearance rate .00719 -3.73E-4 -.00141 -.00532 3.61E-4
(.00674) (.00603) (.00595) (.00683) (.00562)
Violent crime clearance rate -2.19E-4 .0109 .0126 -.0102 .0181
(.00983) (.0105) (.0103) (.0122) (.00944)
Property crime clearance rate .0197** .00289 .00210 -.00194 .00377
(.00596) (.00519) (.00514) (.00571) (.00492)
Total crime offense rate .0134** .00326** .00264** 9.21E-4 .00101
(9.93E-4) (7.53E-4) (7.15E-4) (7.64E-4) (6.77E-4)
Violent crime offense rate 9.87E-4** 1.47E-4 4.91E-5 -1.70E-4 -2.42E-4
(1.54E-4) (1.37E-4) (1.38E-4) (1.73E-4) (1.40E-4)
Property crime offense rate .0124** .00312** .00260** .00110 .00134*
(9.03E-4) (6.88E-4) (6.52E-4) (6.98E-4) (6.26E-4)
Officers assaulted -72.8** -50.8** -27.0* .845 -11.3
(15.9) (16.7) (11.8) (16.1) (15.2)
Officers killed -.0146* -.0143 -.0122 -.0116 -.0219*
(.00740) (.0128) (.0124) (.0132) (.0102)
Include year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Include agency fixed effects? No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Include state trends? No No Yes No No
Include computer index trends? No No No Yes No
Include initial level trends? No No No No Yes
Note: This table reports regressions of the clearance rate (arrests/offenses), offense rate (of-
fenses/population), and officer injuries reported by an agency on a computerization index. Each table
entry represents a coefficient estimate from a separate regression where “Dependent Variable” is the left-
hand side variable and controls are included as specified in the bottom rows of the table. Arrest and
offending figures represent index crimes. All regressions include the percent Black, percent Hispanic, and
per capita income of the area covered by the agency as additional controls. The arrest regressions also
control for state fixed effects and agency size deciles interacted with log number of agency employees. The
offense regressions include indicators for deciles of resident population interacted with log population, log
agency employees, and state fixed effects as additional controls. The assaults and officers killed regressions
also include controls log violent and property arrests, log population, and log employees. Column III
includes state-specific yearly trends, column IV includes indicators for initial levels of the computer index
interacted with year trends, and column V indicators for deciles of the initial value of the dependent vari-
able interacted with year trends as additional controls. Standard errors clustered on agency are reported
in parenthesis. * denotes significance at the two-tailed 5% level and ** the 1% level.
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Table 5: Specifications With Leads and Lags of the Computer Index
Lead Specification Lag Specification
Computer Lead of Computer Lag of
Dependent Variable Index Index Index Index
Departmental Size and Complexity
Number of employees .0681** .0217 .0406** .0238†
Number of special units .425* -.0162 .499** .442**
Organizational levels .0116 .00297 -.0193 -.00686
Total written directives 1.40** .499** .286** 6.48E-4
Departmental Organization
% officers with arrest powers .00187 .00642 .00136 -.00632
% field operations staff -.00367 -.00339 -.00862 .0113
% technical support staff .0572** .0133† .0107 -.00181
Worker Skill and Training
College requirement for new officers .0317 -.0164 .00785 -.00380
Hours of training for new officers 197** -24.2 58.8* 16.8
Arrests, Offenses, and Officer Injury
Total crime clearance rate -.0136 -9.20E-4 .00140 .00151
Violent crime clearance rate .00574 .0267† -.00960 -.0197
Property crime clearance rate -.00921 -.00188 .00140 .00138
Total offending rate .00414** .00230* .00182† .00123
Violent offending rate -9.70E-5 1.28E-6 1.30E-4 2.74E-4†
Property offending rate .00424** .00229* .00169† 9.57E-4
Officers assaulted -33.1 -25.8 -15.8 -39.5†
Officers killed -.0251 -.0123 -.0139 .0156
Note: This table replicates the regressions from Column IV of Tables 2 and Table 4 including leads or
lags in the computer index as additional explanatory variables. Within a specification, each row reports
coefficient estimates from a separate regression. The first specification includes one additional lead of
the index and the second specification a single additional lag. † denotes significance at the two-tailed
10% level, * the 5% level, and ** the 1% level.
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Table 6: Additional Specifications
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
Size Small Large Population Low Budget
Dependent Variable Interaction Agencies Agencies Interaction Shrinking Growth Mid-Size Controls
Departmental Size and Complexity
Number of employees .0315** .0511* .101** .0968** .0562** .0683** .111** .0995**
Number of special units .440** N/A .441** .405** .564 .668* .200 .184
Organizational levels .00178 -.00425 -.00222 -.00355 .0510 .0153 .0247 .0336†
Total written directives .825** .848** 1.73** 1.29** 1.56** 1.37** 1.18** 2.62**
Departmental Organization
% officers with arrest powers .00801 -.00157 .0129* .0101* -7.04E-5 -.00384 -.00930 -.00180
% field operations staff -.00852 N/A -.00734 -.00955 -.0135 -.0193 -.00362 -.0107
% technical support staff .0367** N/A .0592** .0540** .0858** .0849** .0500* .0631**
Worker Skill and Training
College requirement for new officers .0246† .0507** .0280 .0318* .0242 .0246 3.31E-5 .0648**
Hours of training for new officers 116** 116** 243** 166** 172** 167** 106 316**
Arrests, Offenses, and Officer Injury
Total crime clearance rate .00162 .00737 .00315 -.00125 -8.47E-4 -.0105 4.95E-4 -.0111
Violent crime clearance rate .00297 -.0184 .0104 .00833 .0129 .00798 .0124 .00814
Property crime clearance rate .00367 .0134 .00489 .00345 .0104 -.00656 .00595 4.27E-4
Total offending rate 7.00E-4 -.00179 .00274* .00225** .00316† .00310** .00792** .00591**
Violent offending rate -2.16E-4 1.17E-4 3.97E-5 -1.03E-4 2.00E-4 3.17E-4† .00110** 4.37E-4†
Property offending rate 9.29E-4 -.00190 .00270** .00236** .00296* .00278** .00682** .00547**
Officers assaulted -.655 -3.90* -52.6* -21.3 11.7 -12.9 -.424 -8.80
Officers killed -.00810 .0146 -.0149 -.00888 .0398† -.0131 -.00444 -.0345
Note: This table replicates the regressions from Column II of Tables 2 and Table 4 including additional controls. Each table entry reports a
coefficient estimate from a separate regression. Column I includes as additional controls a full set of interactions between deciles of the agency size
distribution (measured by number of employees) and year indicators. Column II includes only agencies with fewer than 25 employees and Column
III with more than 100 employees. Column IV includes a full set interactions between deciles of the population size and year indicators. Column V
limits the analysis to agencies with population decreases over the course of the sample, column VI to agencies with changes in population of less than
10%, and column VII agencies with population between 80000 and 100000. Column VIII includes interactions between the log annual equipment
budget and decile indicators for equipment budget as additional controls. An insufficient number of agencies with fewer than 25 employees reported
having special units and employee function categories to permit estimation. † denotes significance at the two-tailed 10% level, * the 5% level, and
** the 1% level.
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Table 7: Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Effect
of IT Use
First Stage Second Stage
Effect of Instruments on
Computer Index
Measure Pct. Work
Computer
Body
Armor
F-Test of
Instruments
Effect of
Computer
Index on Other
Outcomes
Original
Result
Departmental Size and Complexity
Log(Number of employees) .467* .0486** 11.2 .287 +
(.194) (.0119) [.000] (.152)
Number of special units .253 .0186 1.46 9.85 +
(.214) (.0154) [.232] (6.37)
Organizational levels .414* .0309** 8.13 .567* 0
(.168) (.00988) [.000] (.272)
Total written directives .554** .0223 5.11 7.93** +
(.211) (.0125) [.006] (2.27)
Departmental Organization
% officers with arrest powers .397* .0326** 9.22 -.134 0
(.163) (.00936) [.000] (.0931)
% field operations staff .333 .0125 0.73 -.195 0
(.313) (.0198) [.481] (.325)
% technical support staff .219 .0265 0.99 .205 +
(.347) (.0206) [.370] (.199)
Worker Skill and Training
College requirement for new officers .232 .0297** 5.76 .0672 +
(.168) (.00962) [.003] (.252)
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Hours of training for new officers .411* .0361** 10.2 -396 +
(.169) (.00967) [.000] (260)
Arrests, Offenses, and Officer Injury
Total crime clearance rate .524** .0403** 9.32 .0672 0
(.194) (.0118) [.000] (.0994)
Violent crime clearance rate .516** .0407** 8.42 .213 0
(.199) (.0126) [.000] (.178)
Property crime clearance rate .517** .0415** 9.28 .231* 0
(.197) (.0120) [.000] (.0944)
Total crime offense rate .548** .0414** 10.24 .0835** +
(.193) (.0117) [.000] (.0191)
Violent crime offense rate .548** .0413** 10.22 .00855* 0
(.193) (.0117) [.000] (.00366)
Property crime offense rate .549** .0414** 10.26 .0750** +
(.193) (.0117) [.000] (.0171)
Assaults on officers .620* .0861** 13.13 -648** -
(.262) (.0187) [.000] (183)
Officers killed .620* .0861** 13.13 -.0515 0
(.262) (.0187) [.000] (.119)
Note: This table reports instrumental variables estimates of the effect of IT on organizational and outcome measures. Each table row reports
coefficient estimates from a separate IV regression. In the first stage of the IV regression, the percentage of workers in the agency’s state and
year who used a computer at work and an indicator for agency provision were used as instruments for the computer index. The “F-Stat” column
reports the F-statistic from a joint test of the null that the coefficients on these two instruments are zero; the p-value of this test is reported in
square brackets. The coefficients in the “Second Stage” column report the effect of the predicted value of the computer index on the organizational
or productivity measure of interest and are conceptually equivalent to the coefficients reported in Tables 2 and 4. All regressions include year and
agency fixed effects; the controls for each specification are the same as those in column II of Tables 2 and 4. Standard errors clustered on agency
are reported in parenthesis. * denotes significance at the two-tailed 5% level and ** the 1% level.
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Table 8: Relationship Between Offenses and Specialized Types of IT
Vehicle
Explanatory Variable Total Homicide Rape Larceny Theft
Computer record keeping .0977** .0310 .0476 .0513* -.0246
(.0235) (.0321) (.0276) (.0201) (.0222)
Computer deployment -.0494 -.0242 .0470 -.0106 -.00704
(.0286) (.0348) (.0328) (.0215) (.0260)
N 12077 5373 8294 11728 11085
R2 0.966 0.911 0.935 0.980 0.974
Note: This table reports regressions of the log number of offenses reported by an agency
on measures of computerization of record keeping and computerization of officer deployment.
Each column reports results of a separate regression with the log offense measure used as
dependent variable indicated at the top of the column. The computer record keeping measure
is a 0-1 indicator of whether an agency uses computers for record keeping. The deployment
measure is a index ranging from 0 to 1 of the use of computers for three different deployment
functions. The regressions include the percent Black, percent Hispanic, per capita income,
poverty rate, log number of agency employees, and population decile indicators interacted
with log population as additional controls. The regressions also include agency and year fixed
effects. Standard errors clustered on agency are reported in parenthesis. * denotes significance
at the two-tailed 5% level and ** the 1% level.
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Table 9: Complementarities Between IT and Management Practices in Solving Crimes
Clearance Rate For:
Explanatory Indicator All Crimes Violent Crimes Property Crimes
Compstat .0195* .0229** .0371** .0317* .0132 .0157
(.00823) (.00827) (.0139) (.0135) (.00804) (.00802)
Computer use .00158 .00965 .0196 .0194 .00784 .0146
(.00941) (.00953) (.0166) (.0166) (.00926) (.00934)
High-skilled workers -5.63E-4 .00676 .00150 1.25E-4 .00896 .0144*
(.00642) (.00655) (.0123) (.0120) (.00632) (.00640)
Problem-solving emphasis -.0114* -.00486 -.0353** -.0208* -.0110* -.00400
(.00560) (.00559) (.0106) (.0102) (.00548) (.00543)
Geographic awareness -.00552 .00735 -.0241* .00663 -.00825 .00656
(.00605) (.00657) (.0110) (.0112) (.00593) (.00645)
Evaluation -.00477 -.00319 -.0159 -.00529 -.00377 -.00110
(.00583) (.00577) (.0110) (.0106) (.00563) (.00553)
N 1768 1768 1765 1765 1768 1768
R2 0.005 0.039 0.015 0.086 0.006 0.048
Include demographic controls? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: This table reports agency-level regressions of the 1997-2003 average clearance rate (arrest/offenses) on
indicators for a Compstat system as well as individual modern police management practices. Each column
entry reports coefficient estimates from a separate regression with inclusion of controls as specified in the
bottom row of the table. Agencies with a Compstat system simultaneously implemented elements of all five of
the listed management practices in more than half of the sample years between 1997-2003. The demographic
controls are the average percent Black, percent Hispanic, per capita income, poverty rate, and log population
of the area covered by the agency over 1997-2003. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in
parenthesis. * denotes significance at the two-tailed 5% level and ** the 1% level.
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Table 10: Complementarities Between IT and Management Practices in Deterring Crimes
Offense Rate For:
Explanatory Indicator All Crimes Violent Crimes Property Crimes
Compstat -.00851** -.00473* -8.72E-4* -1.31E-4 -.00764** -.00460*
(.00247) (.00215) (3.85E-4) (2.95E-4) (.00218) (.00196)
Computer use .00108 .00674** -5.05E-4 4.03E-4 .00159 .00634**
(.00206) (.00199) (3.49E-4) (2.97E-4) (.00181) (.00178)
High-skilled workers .00133 .00658** -5.09E-4 4.08E-4* .00184 .00617**
(.00185) (.00161) (2.88E-4) (2.08E-4) (.00164) (.00147)
Problem-solving emphasis .00944** .00830** .00121** 8.52E-4** .00823** .00745**
(.00181) (.00160) (2.74E-4) (2.10E-4) (.00160) (.00145)
Geographic awareness .00455** .00216 .00108** 1.70E-4 .00348* .00199
(.00158) (.00148) (2.45E-4) (2.06E-4) (.00140) (.00134)
Evaluation .00734** .00463** 8.65E-4** 2.30E-4 .00647** .00440**
(.00176) (.00150) (2.82E-4) (2.06E-4) (.00154) (.00136)
N 1768 1768 1768 1768 1768 1768
R2 0.057 0.253 0.046 0.402 0.055 0.216
Include demographic controls? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: This table reports agency-level regressions of the 1997-2003 average offense rate (offenses/population) on indi-
cators for a Compstat system as well as individual modern police management practices. Each column entry reports
coefficient estimates from a separate regression with inclusion of controls as specified in the bottom row of the table.
Agencies with a Compstat system simultaneously implemented elements of all five of the listed management practices
in more than half of the sample years between 1997-2003. The controls are the average percent Black, percent His-
panic, per capita income, poverty rate, and log number of agency employees over 1997-2003. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors are reported in parenthesis. * denotes significance at the two-tailed 5% level and ** the 1% level.
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Figure 1: Trends in Technology Use By Police Agencies
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Appendix
Construction of Management Practices Measures
To examine the role of complementarities in crime reduction, we require separate
agency-level measures of computerization along with relevant modern police man-
agement practices. Following Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally, Greenspan, and Willis
(2003), we identify five components of a Compstat system: 1) information technology
for crime data collection and analysis 2) use of skilled officers 3) a problem-solving par-
adigm 4) feedback-based evaluation and 5) a geographic-based deployment structure.
We code individual survey items 0-1 (No/Yes) to construct each of the five practice
measures. The constituent survey questions corresponding to each practice measure
are:
1. Information Technology (3)
• Does the department use computers for crime analysis?
• Does the department use computers for crime mapping?
• Does the department use computers for investigation?
• Does the department maintain computerized data on criminal histories?
• Does the department maintain computerized data on crime incidents?
• Does the department maintain computerized data on stolen property?
2. Skilled Officers (1)
• Are more than 6 months (1040 hours) of training provided for new officers?
• Are new officers required to have previous college experience?
3. Problem Solving (1.5)
• Are officers encouraged to use SARA-type problem solving?
• Are collaborative problem solving criteria used in officer evaluations?
• Does the agency engage in problem solving projects with community groups
or government agencies?
4. Feedback-Based Evaluation (1)
• Is citizen survey information collected and provided to patrol officers?
• Is citizen survey information collected and used for allocating resources?
• Is citizen survey information collected and used for prioritizing crime/disorder
problems?
• Is citizen survey information collected and used for redistricting patrol ar-
eas?
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5. Geographic Deployment (1)
• Are officers assigned to geographic areas?
• Are detectives assigned cases based on geographic areas?
The numbers in parenthesis above correspond to the average number of annual survey
questions that must be answered positively in order for an agency to be classified as
employing a particular management practice. For example, an agency which answered
yes to 2 of the problem-solving questions in 1997 and 1999, 1 in 2000, and 3 in 2003
would have an average problem-solving response of 2≥1.5, so its problem-solving prac-
tice indicator would be coded as 1. We consider a department as having a Compstat
system in a given year if it answered yes to at least one of the constituent survey items
for each of the five practices in a given year. Compstat agencies were agencies with
Compstat systems in at least half of the available survey years. Of the 1768 agencies
in our pooled sample, 11.4% used Compstat, 85.6% information technology for crime
analysis, 13.8% high-skill officers, 38.5% problem-solving practices, 63.6% geographic
deployment, and 41.3% feedback-based evaluation.
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Table A-1: Alternative Samples and Specifications
Alternative Specification
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Crime Any Better Omit Always
Measure Analysis Computer Panel 1987 Had IT
Departmental Size and Complexity
Log(Number of employees) .0236** .0706** .0811** .0664** .0558**
Number of special units .224** -.126 .430** .525** .562**
Organizational levels .00259 .0507** .0328* .0153 -.0153
Total written directives .524** 2.47** 1.81** .430** .342**
Departmental Organization
% officers with arrest powers 8.83E-4 .0114* .0109† .00747 1.12E-4
% field operations staff .00246 -.0212 -.00744 -.00435 -.00427
% technical support staff .0321** .120** .0745** .00129 .00205
Worker Skill and Training
College requirement for new officers .0225** .0193† .0258 .00297 .0179
Hours of training for new officers 67.5** 216** 205** 40.8* 60.9**
Arrests, Offenses, and Officer Injury
Total crime clearance rate -.00116 -.00210 -.00337 -.00698 -.00202
Violent crime clearance rate -.00982† .0223† .00806 -.00523 .0126
Property crime clearance rate 9.60E-4 .00223 -7.05E-4 -.00126 -3.31E-4
Total offenses rate .00103** .00484** .00374** .00286** .00124
Violent offense rate 1.74E-4* 4.71E-4** 7.93E-5 -5.55E-5 -1.21E-4
Property offense rate 8.58E-4* .00435** .00366** .00292** .00137
Assaults on officers -15.5* -92.9** -54.9** -15.1 -12.3
Officers killed -.00191 -.0242 -.0131 -.00674 -.00940
Note: This table reports robustness checks of the estimated effect of IT use on organizational and arrest outcomes.
Each table entry reports the results of a separate regression. The controls are the same as those reported for
column IV of Tables 2 and 4. Specifications I and II respectively replace the computer index with an indicator
for computerized crime analysis and an indicator for use of any computing technology. Specification III limits
the sample to agencies with available data in 4 or more years. Specification IV omits observations from 1987.
Specification V limits the sample to agencies with a non-zero computer index in their earliest year of reporting.
Each table entry reports a coefficient estimate from a separate regression. Standard errors clustered on agency are
reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the two-tailed 5% level and ** the 1% level.
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Table A-2: Initial Litigation and IT Use
Avg. Litigation
Group Cases Per 100 (I) (II)
Employees
0-10 percentile .435 .0129 -.0312
(.0563) (.0584)
10-20 percentile .964 -.0682 -.0532
(.0685) (.0665)
20-30 percentile 1.35 -.0831 -.0986
(.0577) (.0576)
30-40 percentile 1.73 -.138* -.174**
(.0611) (.0615)
40-50 percentile 2.11 -.0473 -.0789
(.0590) (.0597)
50-60 percentile 2.58 -.0293 -.0499
(.0536) (.0544)
60-70 percentile 3.42 -.0698 -.115
(.0636) (.0638)
70-80 percentile 4.60 -.0545 -.0727
(.0654) (.0643)
80-90 percentile 6.69 -.0844 -.128*
(.0523) (.0526)
90-100 percentile 15.3 .0152 -2.15E-6
(.0529) (.0542)
N 709 2278
R2 0.025 0.659
Note: This table reports regressions of the final level of the IT index
on indicators for deciles for the amount of litigation experienced
by an agency in 1987. Each column reports coefficient estimates
from a separate regression. Coefficients are measured relative to
agencies with no reported litigation cases in 1987. Specification
I limits the analysis to agencies for which IT data was available
in 1999 while specification II includes all agencies with at least
one observation on IT after 1987. Both regressions include the
initial level of the computer index as a control and specification II
includes indicators for the final year in which IT data was available
as additional controls. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the two-tailed
5% level and ** the 1% level.
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